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CHECK DIGITS FOR DECIMAL ERRORS
Human beings still use decimal numbers in everyday affairs, and when working with these numbers they make decimal mistakes-such as copying a single digit incorrectly or transposing two adjacent digits. Machines that read decimal numbers also make decimal-oriented mistakes-mainly just misreading a digit. To help protect against errors, decimal numbers used in business (such as account numbers) often have an extra check digit. There is usually a check equation which all digits, including the check digit, must satisfy. In this way the check digit itself is also protected against errors. If the check equation is not true then there is definitely an error present. If the check equation is true, however, one or more errors may still be present. A check digit also gives some protection against an attempt to use a random account number, since this act would be caught 90 percent of the time.
As an example, the check equation might add the digits, take the remainder on division by 10 Of course, if a,, is the check digit, then one must choose a, so that the equation is true. This method will always detect an error in a single digit, and it will detect 90 percent of all errors. Nevertheless, it will not detect transpositions. If human beings are involved, transposing adjacent digits is a common error, so this scheme is not ideal in such a case. This method might be suitable for an optical scanning system that might occasionally have trouble reading a digit, but knows the :position of the digit in error. If x is the unknown digit, and s is the check sum without x, then one has (x + s) mod 10 = 0, orx=lO-s,ifs#O,andx=Oifs=O. The ISBN number of a book uses a mod 11 check [5] . Here the check equation is (a, + 2*a2 + 3*a3 + . . . + n*an) mod 11 = 0, n 5 10.
If n > 10, just keep repeating weights from 1 to 10. For ISBN numbers, n = 10, and the digits are written in reverse order, with a, used as the check digit to make its calculation easier. Unfortunately, this check digit has a value from 0 to 10, and the ISBN number uses an X to represent 10. Thus, it is not really a decimal check digit. The mod 11 check detects any single error and transposition of any two digits, whether adja.cent or not (assuming n 5 10).
Many account numbers (such as Mastercard) use a special mod 10 check, often called the "IBM check." The check equation looks like (2#a, + a2 + 2#a3 + a4 + . . .) mod 10 = 0, with the understanding that 2#ai is to be calculated by multiplying ai by 2 and adding the decimal digits, that is, 2#ai = (2*a,) div 10 + (2*a,) mod 10. For example, if the account number is 54996, then the check equation without the check digit is (2#5 + 4 + 2#9 + 9 + 2#6) mod 10 =(1+4+9+9+3)mod10=26mod10=6, so that the check digit must equal 4. This scheme detects all single-digit errors as well as all adjacent transpositions except for 09 and 90. Thus it catches 97.777 percent of adjacent transposition errors (88 out of 90).
Other schemes are used in practice. For example, United States banks put an eight-digit processing number on checks and add a check digit with check equation (3*& + 7*u2 + us + 3*u4 + 7*u5 + u6 + 3*u7 + 7*us + ug) mod 10 = 0. These repeated factors of 3, 7, and 1 mean that adjacent transpositions of digits that differ by 5 are not caught. Thus 10 percent of adjacent transposition errors would go undetected. The authors were unable to discover the origin of this scheme.
THE CONSULTATION
As mentioned earlier, we were consulted about the process of evaluating an error detection scheme for new account numbers being introduced. The proposed scheme would use an eight-digit account number followed by four additional digits, Digit 9 would be chosen so that digits 1 through 9 would satisfy the ISBN mod 11 check. Digits 10 and 11 would be random, and digit 12 would be chosen so that all 12 digits would satisfy the IBM mod 10 check. Specifically, they asked for the error rate, and also asked if there was anything to be gained by adding the two-digit random number.
In turn, we had more questions than answers. What if the mod 11 check required a 10 for the ninth digit? What kind of errors were visualized? Were there security threats from malicious individuals? Finally, what was the purpose of the two random digits? We could only imagine that they would make it harder (100 times as hard) to guess a legitimate account number, even for someone who knew the method of checking. We wondered why the firm was asking us about the purpose of these two extra digits.
A senior official answered our questions and described the environment. The firm had a mailing list of 19 million names and addresses-one of their important resources. At that time, they had employees keying in each name and address by hand, perhaps 30-40 keystrokes, followed by the order itself. In the new proposed system, most customers would paste a mailing label on their order form with the new account number on it. The operator would key in only the account number, 12 keystrokes, followed by the order. They hoped to improve accuracy and eliminate keystrokes. They saw no external threats but were especially concerned about errors. (An error would mean merchandise incorrectly sent, and subsequent customer problems.)
In response to other questions, they said they would not use account numbers that had the ISBN mod 11 check digit come out to 10. The errors they envisioned as most common were what we expected: single errors or adjacent transpositions. The extra two random digits were there to scatter the account numbers. They would process the accounts in alphabetical order and were afraid that there might be many cases of "Joe Smith's" with very similar addresses, and they did not want the corresponding account numbers too close together.
FIRST RECOMMENDATIONS
We first recommended not using any check digits. The account number would be keyed in, looked up, and the associated name and address displayed to the operator, who could just compare the display with the mailing label.
We proposed to scatter account numbers in one of several ways (without extra random digits) and still process the accounts in alphabetical order. One could store successive account numbers in a small buffer (e.g., size loo), and pseudorandomly select them for assignment to a name and address, replacing the buffer location with the next account number. One could get a similar effect by simply using a fixed pseudorandom rearrangement of the numbers from 00 to 99, and assigning accounts in blocks of 100.
We also considered using a fixed pseudorandom sequence of length equal to the largest prime less than 100 million (99999989). Account numbers would be pseudorandomly scattered throughout the range, and the current latest account number (the seed] would show where to take up the sequence for new account numbers. In the end, we did not mention this scheme to {he firm.
In one meeting, officials from the firm explained that they had a fixed hardware setup and would not be able to modify it. As configured, the names and addresses were not available online. Order information was keyed in and transferred on tape to a remote batch system where the account information was kept. They used schemes for matching the keyed-in name and address with the form that was actually in their system. These schemes were error prone, however, and there was no operator feedback about keying errors. They would be able to carry out the account number checks online and let the operator know immediately that the number was keyed in incorrectly, unless the errors happened to create another account number with valid check digits. They again emphasized their desire for a low error rate.
They never did seem to understand our proposals for scattering account numbers with no extra digits. However, they did agree with our suggestion that if two extra digits were used, the digits might as well also be check digits. Such check digits would essentially be pseudorandom and should scatter account numbers as well as random digits. We tentatively suggested a mod 97 check for these two digits.
They also mentioned that the leading zeros of account numbers would not be keyed in. This caused us some concern because a dropped digit might be a fairly common error. We mentioned our discovery that the mod 10 check would not catch adjacent transpositions of 09 and 90. The senior official said he had heard this before, however.
LATER RECOMMENDATIONS
With four check digits, we recommended using a mod 97 check between the mod 11 and the mod 10. The mod 97 check equation just treats the whole lldigit number as an integer and takes the remainder on division by 97, getting zero if valid. In effect, the weights are successive powers of 10, mod 97. We investigated other possible weights for a mod 97 check and concluded that successive powers of 10 are optimal (though not unique) for detecting adjacent double errors.
Usi:ng all four check digits, we simulated 370,000 random double errors and got no single valid account number, though 37 would have been expected from true random errors. This made it look as if all (or almost all) double errors would be caught, though we had no proof of this fact. Simulated random triple errors produced the expected 0.01 percent error rate. We recommended keying in leading zeros since we were able to produce simulation results showing approximately a 1 percent error rate from a single dropped digit if two check digits were used.
We wanted to propose a more elegant single mod 997 or mod 9973 check. This would be simpler to compute and would not require dropping account numbers, as the mod 11 check did.
We did not make this recommendation for several reasons. The firm was all geared up to use the mod 11 and mod 10 checks, and they believed in them. They were willing to add another check since that could not make the system weaker. Also, we did not know the best choice of weights to use for mod 997 or mod 9973 checks, and we had run out of time for further investigation. We could not guarantee that a single mod 9973 check was superior to the more complex setup, nor could we guarantee that it had no hidden weaknesses.
In the end, they decided they wanted the extremely low error rate provided by four check digits. They also decided to start account numbers at 10000000, so that there would be no leading zeros. Soon after, one of the programmers called with questions about implementing the mod 97 check, but seemed to get back on track. In a follow-up six months later, the senior official said they had implemented exactly what we had discussed and were very pleased with the outcome. ANOTHER SCHEME: VERHOEFF'S WORK Months after making our recommendations, we had stopped looking for a single check decimal that would detect all single errors and all adjacent transpositions, and instead we were working on a proof that no such check existed. Then we located the interesting 1969 monograph by J. Verhoeff [z, 81. In this work. we found that others had published such proofs, implicitly assuming a fixed weight or permutation applied to each digit, followed by addition modulo 10. But Verhoeff discovered more complex methods that will detect all these errors. (During final revisions of the present article, [3] appeared, which describes the rediscovery of Verhoeff's methods by Gumm [4] . ) Verhoeff also gives a thorough discussion of various alternative checks. In addition to many methods for detecting all single errors and all adjacent transpositions, he presents other common kinds of human errors, along with checks to detect as many of these errors as possible. Among errors mentioned as occurring in a specific study of 12000 errors are the following, with percentages in parentheses. One of Verhoeff's best checks, which we present in complete detail, will catch all single errors and all adjacent transpositions. It will also catch 95.555 percent of twin errors, and 94.222 percent of jump transpositions and jump twin errors (or 94.1666 percent of these jump errors if a, b and c must all be distinct). Finally, it will catch 95.3125 percent of phonetic errors, assuming that a ranges from 2 to 9. We programmed this check, exactly as we will describe, and obtained these figures by simple exhaustive search. (Verhoeff gives the same percentages.)
Verhoeff's clever idea was to use a method for combining the integers from 0 to 9 that is different from addition module 10. This method is based on a group known as the dihedral group Ds, represented by the symmetries of a pentagon [l] . Multiplication in this group is not commutative, that is, a'+ b is not always equal to b*a. (We use * for the group operation and 0 for the identity element.) Just combining digits over this group works better than adding digits mod 10 since in both cases all single errors are caught, yet in D5 two-thirds of the adjacent transpositions are caught (whereas none are caught mod 10). Verhoeff considers check equations of the form ji(al)*j2(a21* ..-*jn(a,l = 0, '0123456789  1234067895  2340178956  3401289567  4012395678  5987604321  6598710432  7659821043  8765932104  .9676543210 where multiplication is over Ds and fi, jz, . . . , fn are permutations of the ten digits. He is able to get an excellent check in the special case where fi is just the ith iteration of a fixed permutation f.
This check is not hard to program and is quite efficient, but it does employ several tables. With mod 11 checks one must be prepared to use an X to represent 10 in the check digits, or else one must throw out 17.36 percent of the possible sequences of data digits (since 21 out of each 121 sequences have one or both of the two check digits equal to 10). Our firm was willing to discard some account numbers, but would not have been interested in this approach because they had no need for error correction. 
ERROR CORRECTION
The most common checks for error detection using a single digit are the ISBN mod 11 check and the IBM mod 10 check, but each of these has a significant disadvantage. The ISBN mod 11 check needs an extra character to represent 10, or else requires that one eliminate account numbers with check digit 10. The IBM mod 10 check does not catch all adjacent transpositions, failing for 09 and 90. A fairly simple and efficient check (Verhoeff's check) eliminates these disadvantages. A year later we learned that for two mod 11 check For a very low error rate, firms might consider two digits, a single-error correcting code is available: a Hamcheck digits and a mod 97 check, with weights succes-sive powers of 10. This check catches 100 percent of each of the errors on Verhoeff's list, and 99.94 percent of adjacent double errors. Overall, it catches nearly 99 percent of all errors, compared with 90 percent for the single digit checks, and it is easy to calculate by hand. Two mod 11 check digits perform even better than a mod 97 check, including single error correction with ten or fewer data digits, but this approach has the disadvantages mentioned above for mod 11 checks: Either an X is needed to represent 10, or account numbers with one of the check digits equal to 10 must be eliminated.
Finally, in dealing with commercial firms as a consultant, one should avoid excessively technical or academic recommendations.
Companies want workable, simp1.e solutions that they understand and believe in. We regarded our consulting firm's final scheme with its three separate checks as an overly complicated solution, but it satisfied the company's needs. In the same way, the IBM mod 10 check, because of its simplicity, is superior to Verhoeff's check for most commerical uses.
